A sulfuric haze of green and gold hangs over McLane Stadium on the night of the Revivalry against TCU, left behind by a fireworks and colored-smoke display. Despite the cool night air, fans sip icy $10 Pops strawberry lemonades and crane their necks toward a drone show flashing near Gate D.
Those not following the floating bear head have their eyes on quarterback Derek “DJ” Lagway Jr. The fourth quarter is about to begin, and Baylor hasn’t scored a touchdown. Lagway is struggling to complete passes, and as message boards and comment sections would later show, many fans are asking the same question: Why doesn’t head coach Dave Aranda bring in the backup?
Baylor lost 17-6. The roster on the field that night cost an estimated $20 million to $23 million to assemble, according to a report by The Athletic.
Eight days later, Aranda was out of a job — his estimated $4.7 million salary not included in The Athletic’s $20M figure. Baylor fired him Sunday morning, the day after a 25-24 loss at Kansas — the Jayhawks’ first win over the Bears in 20 years — dropped Baylor to 4-3. Aranda finishes 40-40 across seven seasons. After a 12-2 Big 12 championship season in 2021, Baylor had just one winning record in the four seasons that followed. Defensive coordinator Joe Klanderman will serve as interim head coach.
Baylor’s estimated roster budget ranks 45th of the 68 teams in The Athletic’s survey. That’s a fraction of the roughly $50 million at Ohio State and the University of Texas, and behind TCU ($22 million to $25 million) and Big 12 leader Texas Tech ($38 million to $42 million), but ahead of Kansas ($15 million to $17 million). It’s not immediately clear to fans what that money may buy or where it comes from, agreed a Baylor sports management professor, a longtime Texas college football reporter, and a Central Texas NIL attorney. Their consensus: Spending more doesn’t guarantee a winning season, but a program can’t compete without it. For a private school in a small market, finding more money is harder than it looks.
Bruiser, We’re Not in 2014 Anymore
Historically, the NCAA has been strict in ensuring that college athletes do not benefit financially from their time on the field or court, banning brand deals for students (known as name, image, and likeness, or NIL) and direct revenue sharing with players.
The rules covered everything. According to regional news station WISTV, in 2009, South Carolina reported a secondary violation against its men’s basketball program for impermissible snacks. The news station reported it learned the program had fed athletes bagels with fruit, which was not a food approved to purchase for players outside of scheduled meal times. Food restrictions were eventually lifted in 2014.
Over the years the NCAA has eased off restrictions surrounding athlete incentives, allowing players to receive cost-of-attendance stipends and eat bagels after sunset. Those rules didn’t loosen on their own. Over the past decade, athletes repeatedly sued the NCAA under antitrust law, arguing that schools agreeing to limit athlete pay was akin to illegal wage-fixing. In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously sided with athletes in NCAA v. Alston, with Justice Brett Kavanaugh writing that “the NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America.”
Within weeks, in July 2021, the NCAA officially lifted its ban on athlete engagement with NIL deals. Then, in June 2025, following a federal court settlement, the NCAA began to allow revenue sharing with athletes. According to the 2025 settlement, schools that opt in must cap their total athletic revenue share at 22 percent of the average revenue for Power Five schools (consisting of the five largest football conferences: the ACC, the SEC, the Big 12, the Big Ten, and the Pac-12).
That revenue sharing cap is $21.3 million for the 2026-27 school year. That’s the maximum amount of money a school can pay its athletes directly from its own athletic department budget, and the pot is split between all sports an athletics program wants to put money toward. Before the first year of revenue sharing, former Athletic Director Mack Rhoades told Baylor+ the University would put 75 percent of its revenue sharing budget toward football, 15 percent to men’s basketball, 5 percent to women’s basketball, and 5 percent toward its other sports programs.
There’s no cap, however, on money an athlete can earn from outside sources, including NIL deals with businesses or booster-funded collectives. Baylor student-athletes specifically have access to GXG, an NIL collective by Startup Waco; Link254, a platform built into the athletic department’s infrastructure to expand revenue pathways; Baylor NIL Exchange, a portal allowing commercial entities and fans to connect directly with student-athletes; and sport-specific NIL clubs where fans can financially support specific rosters.
The Athletic clarifies the figures it reports ($20-23 million at Baylor) “refer to the amount of money a school had at its disposal to assemble its 2026 roster — setting aside any player income not managed or controlled by the football program, such as endorsements with national brands. The money comes from a combination of athletic department revenue, outside booster donations and other sources that vary from school to school.”
Now, the NCAA has rallied support for a Congressional bill drafted by Senators Ted Cruz and Maria Cantwell: Senate Bill 4668, the “Protect College Sports Act.” This bill creates legal guidelines for NIL, caps for player compensation and agent fees, and transfer limits for players and coaches, amongst other changes. The bill was passed in the Senate on September 28 and is awaiting further review in the House of Representatives.
What’s a Bear to Do?
Mike Craven, senior writer for Dave Campbell’s Texas Football, explained that if Baylor football — whose $20-23 million roster price tag ranks at the lower half of approximately 70 football programs — wants to survive a future ruled by heavy-pocketed programs, it will need to contend with the price tag. Bigger spending is not a guarantee of a great season, he noted, but the data doesn’t lie — money definitely helps.
“Back in the days before name, image and likeness money and the transfer portal, the best predictor of a team’s success was usually its high school recruiting class ranking,” The Athletic writes. “Today, it’s the roster budget. A program spending $40 million is expected to beat ones spending half that.”
The 14 highest-spending teams were all ranked in the AP Top 25 after Week 2.
“You know, I think that’s one of the advantages Texas Tech has,” Craven said. “They have [boosters like] Cody Campbell and John Sellers and those guys, but they also have (hundreds of thousands of) living alumni because they have so many students. So if they can get $5 from 50 percent of that, that goes a lot further than $5 from every living TCU alumni or Baylor alumni.”
According to Baylor sports management professor Dr. Jeffrey Petersen, the schools listed in The Athletic article likely reached out to external sources, like boosters, to quickly fund the new revenue share needs that emerged last year.
“I don’t believe most of those organizations work with a hefty savings,” he said. “Money comes in and typically those types of organizations are much more of a pass-through, as far as they raise the money and then they distribute the money. I don’t know very many of these foundations that then just kind of hold money.”
However, Craven noted that Baylor, operating as a top-shelf price tag private school, may draw in students from wealthier families who go on to make higher salaries, becoming more powerful boosters. Boosters have maintained steady levels of generosity for the athletic department, as the Baylor Bear Foundation gifted a total of $24.4 million to Baylor Athletics for the 2025-2026 school year, according to Baylor Athletics’ Year in Review report. The breakdown of how this money will be spent, however, is not publicly available.
Duane Miller, an NIL lawyer based out of Belton, pointed out that Baylor has an advantage in the volatile game of college football that doesn’t rest on revenue sharing.
“Certain schools have kind of embraced NIL, and certain schools are kind of still trying to find their footing a little bit, and Baylor strikes me as one that has loads of potential — not to mention, loads of money,” Miller said. “I mean, you’re the largest Baptist institution in the world. And I will tell you, just in the legal field, Baylor University is a very, very big player. That’s a smaller network than say your UT’s or your A&M’s — places like that just because of your numbers. But if you’re talking sheer power, sheer connections, and just sheer amounts of money, you know, Baylor doesn’t really take a backseat to anyone.”
Petersen is more skeptical of Baylor’s ability to draw major NIL contracts that might subsidize the need for higher revenue share.
“I think it’d probably be a little bit more difficult for Baylor, because some of it’s going to be related to the market size that you have,” he said. “Number one, we’ve got a smaller market in Waco in general, and then you’ve got a smaller reach of the size of our alumni base . . . Or if you’re looking at, you know, an organization that’s in a major metro area, does TCU have a slight advantage just from being in a DFW metro area over Waco and Baylor?”
Baylor’s recent track record with athletic revenue hasn’t been anything to sneeze at, either, according CNBC’s sports valuations for last season. In 2025, Baylor athletics as a whole was valued at $585 million. Baylor athletics made $148 million in 2024, its valuation rose 14 percent in 2025, and revenue increased by 8 percent. But, Petersen pointed out, a decent valuation or revenue does not exclude the likelihood that schools are still spending more than they bring in.
Ultimately, football programs such as Baylor’s will rely heavily on the tenor of booster clubs’ discussions, Craven noted.
“For a very long time in college athletics, you spent money to get your name on a building or you spent money to get a coach,” Craven said “… Not everybody’s boosters have shown so far that they have the stomach to spend that on a defensive end or a linebacker. And it’s because they don’t think their return on investment is that strong — right? What if that player is only there for a year and then they bounce?”
Though one solution to the problem of cost might simply be to rethink Baylor’s (or any school’s) prioritization of football over other programs, Craven posited that it’s simply not that simple. Turning down the investment on football teams may not be a viable option for a school like Baylor, as football powers enrollment.
“Alabama’s enrollment went up astronomically when Nick Saban was there,” he said. “TCU’s enrollment went up huge after they went on that 2022 national championship run. Football success in the environment in which you can provide for those students is the neon sign outside the bar that is a university. And if you want the enrollment to stay, if you want the donations to stay, you have to be at the top level.”
Following the Money
Determining what a university actually spends on its football program can be near impossible for observers on the outside, as different parts of each athletic department measure expenses differently, Craven explained.
“There is an incentive for head coaches to want people to think that number is lower,” Craven said. “Like, ‘Hey, look how much more we’re doing with less (money).’ And then on the other side, administrators want that number to look higher, because at the crux of their job, at least now, is fundraising … Dave Aranda would want the perception of that number to be lower while the athletic director would want the perception of that number to be higher because then it makes (his) job look better.”
The Athletic notes in its estimation that “Few people inside a college football program building know their school’s exact numbers. And even if they do, many don’t feel comfortable sharing it, even anonymously.”
On April 7, University President Linda Livingstone spoke with Baylor’s Faculty Senate. According to meeting minutes, an instructor asked of the current costs for student-athlete compensation, as well as of long-term strategies to ensure sustainability, including ways to offset revenue.
A note-taker paraphrased Livingstone’s response:
“It is important to understand what is revenue sharing and what is NIL. For revenue sharing an institution can pay up to $20.5 million in revenue share and it will increase annually by 3%. After 3 years there will be a analysis to see if the 3% is enough or appropriate. Clearly this is a huge expense that we have not had to pay in the past. We need to look at how to internally raise revenue to buffer that $20.5 million (which is generally funded by TV revenue). How do we grow sponsorships – now we can do uniform patches on student athletes – looking into it. Turned down a sports gambling company. We have more flexibility – can do logos on the field. How do we grow those sources that feed into Athletics? Baylor’s Athletic Director Doug McNamee recently did hire Dave Harper – creating a revenue group within Athletics. This should help us generate revenue and NIL. If we hire new people in Athletics, they should be bringing in Revenue”
Livingstone’s answer suggests most of the revenue-share money comes from TV deals. But Petersen said it’s difficult for anyone outside a university’s administration to verify a specific breakdown of where athletic money comes from, or where cuts land. In February, Baylor announced a budget reduction of $35 million across the board, following a comprehensive review process that included the athletic department.
Petersen suggested that, in general, an athletic department drawing money, however indirectly, from academics or student athletic fees is a reality some schools may face — it’s just difficult for most involved to know when it’s happening.
“How many more years will that need to happen?” he said, pondering Baylor’s recent budget reduction. “And we’re not probably super transparent on where that occurs, as far as how much of a cut did athletics take? How much of a cut did the general faculty and employees take? Other elements — I mean, benefits were reduced this past year across all employees. So it wasn’t just academics . . . The institution is still here and the athletic department is still here, so we’re like, ‘Well, I guess everything is OK.'”
The full capabilities of an Aranda-less coaching staff or true playing acumen of DJ Lagway are mysteries unknowable to the average fan until the season ends. But for those who believe that spending more on Baylor’s football program would produce a winning season, a variable remains: who is prepared to give Baylor more money specifically for its football players?
“The bottom line is, you can’t do well if you have no talent,” Petersen said. “You can’t say, ‘Guess what? We’re going to do no payments. We don’t want to play this way, yet we’re still going to compete and put a team out.’ Then you will not be able to compete at all.”
And yet another variable hovers in congressional purgatory: the potential passage of the Protect College Sports Act.
